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vivors. She has followed and incorporated the 
relevant literature. Camp literature, fictional 
prose, novels, historical novels and films have 
provided ideas, inspiration and, at times, as 
she admits, a firmer mental guide than the his-
torical source. The author aptly demonstrates 
the deficient management of sites of memory 
in Greece, which raise “uncomfortable” issues 
between Greeks and Germans and between 
Greek Jews and Greeks, and the two sides 
of the Civil War. The conflicting and traumat-
ic memory of the Second World War, including 
the selective amnesia of the occupation, is the 
reason why a unified memory culture did not 
emerge after the war.
The explosion of European memory in the 
1990s highlighted the policies of memory as 
a special research area. The study of sites of 
memory is thus virgin soil in the rich Greek 
historiography on the 1940s. In this sense, the 
present study is a most welcome contribution 
to the newly emerging field of memory stud-
ies in Greece. By highlighting for future histori-
ans the unexplored areas of research such as 
the study of divided memories at various sites 
of memory throughout Greece and the study 
of the memorials of the civil war, Droumpouki 
expresses her belief that material remains, 
these visible traces of the past, will ultimately 
create the ideal conditions for a cultural read-
ing and understanding of the 1940s.
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou
NATO and Western Perceptions of 
the Soviet Bloc: Alliance Analysis 
and Reporting, 1951–1969
London: Routledge, 2014. xii + 228 pp. 
Sotiris Roussos
University of Peloponnese
The study of the policy-making process is al-
ways a fascinating exploration, even in cir-
cumstances where an iron-clad balance of 
power and a state’s interests ultimately dic-
tate foreign policy positions. This is even more 
so in the case of alliances, where the effort to 
legitimise the allied position is indispensable. 
Cold War international politics were always 
a mixture of geopolitics and ideology and, 
thus, the case for legitimisation was always 
of major importance. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou 
stresses the importance of the legitimisation 
process from the outset. At the same time, 
the bipolar system that dominated Cold War 
politics led the superpowers to legitimise their 
hegemonic positions within their respective 
camps. In that sense Hatzivassiliou’s work on 
Nato’s analysis and reporting process in the 
first two decades of its existence is most in-
teresting and welcome.
The book examines the internal politics be-
fore, during and after the composition of ma-
jor analyses and reporting papers. It research-
es the institutional changes that accompanied 
this composition, the stance of the alliance’s 
major powers and the accuracy and the effec-
tiveness of these reports in influencing Nato 
strategy. It also focuses on the role played by 
certain individuals in both the drafting of the 
reports and the initiation of new institutional 
frameworks. The study of this analytical pro-








cess addresses, firstly, “the external context”, 
notably the pressures created by the Cold War 
that served as a powerful centripetal force; 
secondly, the intra-alliance debate, usually 
centring on the reassurance of the hegem-
onic role of the USA and on the taxonomy of 
the member states, that is, the distinction be-
tween major and smaller, richer and poorer 
and “front-line” and “rear” states.
As early as 1952, a comprehensive analy-
sis of the Soviet threat reaffirmed a series of 
views already held by the alliance. The anal-
ysis looked into both political and economic 
developments in the Soviet Union and con-
cluded that the Kremlin’s strategy remained 
unaltered. It basically discerned two patterns 
in the Soviet strategy: the first was the direct 
subversion of countries through violent inter-
vention, as in the case of Korea, and the sec-
ond, that of forced subversion either by inter-
nal revolution, as in the cases of Greece and 
Indochina, or by coup, as in the Czechoslovak 
case. The report noted the rapid growth of So-
viet GNP, particularly in the industrial sector, 
but it took assurance from the west’s eco-
nomic lead. 
The report seemed to side with the British view 
proposing that a protracted cold war was more 
likely than a hot confrontation between the So-
viets and Nato. This caused concern on the part 
of the Americans, who were afraid that under-
estimating the prospect of a hot confrontation 
would relax the Allies’ alertness and steadfast-
ness and that this would lessen the need for 
US hegemony in Europe. Here a distinction can 
be made between “imperialistic” behaviour, in-
volving attempts by the Americans to impose 
their agenda on their allies, and “hegemonic” 
authority, which could be exercised when US 
concerns were shared by all or almost all of 
the other members.
Failures to analyse the inner-Soviet pow-
er mechanisms were evident throughout the 
1950s, a decade marked by the striking events 
of the 20th congress of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the diplomatic 
tactics of the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrush-
chev. Despite the regularisation of the analy-
sis process, Nato’s analysis mechanism failed 
to predict such impressive changes in Soviet 
leadership and policy. The working groups on 
Soviet trends were scheduled to meet monthly, 
despite the scepticism of the British and Amer-
icans towards regularising the analysis pro-
cesses. It was German and French support that 
led to the establishment of monthly working 
groups. These groups, however, were staffed 
mainly by diplomats from the national dele-
gations to Nato. Compared to the information 
flow enjoyed by the American national analysis 
process, these groups enjoyed very little intel-
ligence input and lacked input from specialised 
experts. Their failures in analysing and pre-
dicting Soviet developments undermined their 
credibility and rendered a reorganisation of the 
analysis and reporting processes necessary.
From the drafts of the reports and the reorgan-
isation of the analysis process in the 1950s, it 
is evident that the balance between the USA 
and the old European great powers was still 
in the making. Although no one disputed the 
indispensable role of the USA in safeguarding 
western Europe from communist domination, 
Britain and France had yet to accept Washing-
ton’s hegemonic position. In this context, the 
analysis and reporting process could be seen 
as one more “device” for the old powers to in-
fluence the alliance. It would take the Suez cri-
sis in 1956, when the Americans thwarted An-
glo–French colonial plans in Egypt, to define 
the balance of power in the western bloc. 
In the late 1950s the Nato analysis was preoc-
cupied with four other issues: intra-Nato rela-
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tions; the Soviet Union’s relations with the so-
cialist republics in Eastern Europe and, most 
importantly, Sino–Soviet relations; the eco-
nomic potential of the Soviet Union and, last 
but not least, Soviet overtures to the Third 
World. Addressing the shortcomings of pre-
vious analyses and reports, in 1956 the Nato 
council ministerial session set up the Com-
mittee of Three, comprising the foreign min-
isters of Italy (Gaetano Martino), Norway (Hal-
vard Lange) and Canada (Lester B. Pearson). 
The report of the committee stressed “the 
need to strengthen internal solidarity, cohesion 
and unity” of the alliance. In other words, the 
trio’s findings reflected the fear that Khrush-
chev’s new tactics would drive a wedge be-
tween the western allies or sow the seeds of 
revolution in their societies, given the serious 
inequalities that persisted in the Allied econo-
mies. Thus they called for economic and po-
litical cooperation in order to dissipate Soviet 
propaganda and show the superiority of west-
ern societies and economies. Some years lat-
er, in 1959, the issue of détente was seen by 
Nato’s Committee of Political Advisors as a 
reason for intra-Nato cohesion problems as a 
result of the Soviet change in tone. 
From 1957 to 1960 Nato analysts focused on 
Soviet influence on the non-aligned states. 
They believed that the new Soviet leadership’s 
thinking was based on a triangle comprising 
the Soviet bloc, Nato and the non-aligned na-
tions. In 1960 the Nato experts believed there 
was a Soviet “economic offensive”, as eco-
nomic growth allowed Moscow to undertake 
major initiatives in the non-aligned world, es-
pecially in those countries recently liberated 
from colonial rule and tutelage. Throughout 
the 1960s, despite the fact that trade between 
the non-aligned and Nato allies remained 
much larger than with the Soviet bloc, it ap-
peared that the relatively small levels of Sovi-
et economic aid could leverage much greater 
political influence due to the anticolonial and 
anti-western ideology and rhetoric that ac-
companied it.
In the 1960s the analysis and reporting pro-
cess came to address mostly problems that 
arouse from the détente policies, the possi-
bility of expanding West–East trade and the 
inequalities in economic and social develop-
ment among alliance members. The prob-
lems addressed here correspond directly to 
what Morton Kaplan describes as the “loose 
bipolar system”, “characterised by the pres-
ence of two major bloc actors, a leading na-
tional actor within each bloc, non-member 
national actors, and universal actors, all of 
whom perform unique and distinctive role 
functions within the system”.1 In such a sys-
tem the two blocs are destined to negotiate 
rather than to fight, to fight minor rather than 
major wars, and to fight major wars rather 
than to fail to eliminate the rival bloc. Particu-
larly after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the 
two blocs preferred to negotiate rather than 
fight, leading to the rise of certain concerns 
in both the frontline states, which feared that 
Nato military aid might be reduced, and the 
US, which was concerned about the alliance’s 
cohesion.
Hatzivassiliou devotes much attention to the 
various transformations in Nato’s analysis/
reporting bodies and groups. Most of these 
transformations vacillated between relying on 
diplomatic representatives and the high offi-
cials of the national governments and on sci-
entists, academics and experts, who staffed 
the expert groups particularly in the 1960s. In 
this analysis/reporting process, the epistem-
ic communities, which, as Peter Haas argued, 
can influence policy debates due to their pro-
fessional training, prestige and reputation of 
expertise, played no role.








Hatzivassiliou’s book makes a substantial 
contribution to our understanding of essential 
features and complex interactions within Nato 
policy debates. Based on exhaustive research 
in the relevant Nato archives, it reveals a live-
ly debate on both the institutionalisation of the 
alliance and its role as a global, and not only a 
European, security player. In the Cold War of 
geopolitics and ideology, the legitimacy and 
political cohesion of the alliance was perhaps 
as crucial as military strength. The study in-
cludes a select bibliography providing the nec-
essary political/historical context.
NOTE
1   Morton A. Kaplan, System and process in in-
ternational politics (Colchester: ECPR Press, 
2015), 48.
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Yiannos Katsourides’ History of the Commu-
nist Party in Cyprus: Colonialism, Class and the 
Cypriot Left begins with a simple goal: to ex-
amine the establishment and development of 
the Communist Party of Cyprus (ΚΚΚ, 1922–
1944), namely a formation that preceded, 
played a decisive role in setting up, and even-
tually merged with the Progressive Party of 
Working People (Akel, 1941–), arguably the 
electorally most successful communist party 
in Europe. In its 266 pages, the book exceeds 
its stated objective by making at least three 
additional and important contributions: it pro-
vides a clear survey of the island’s socioeco-
nomic situation in the interwar period, tying up 
the fragmentary references in the existing lit-
erature; it offers a contextualised analysis of 
party formation in Cyprus under British rule; 
and finally, beyond the historiography of Cy-
prus, it presents a carefully researched case 
study of political organisation under the specif-
ic circumstances of interwar British imperial-
ism, marked by anticommunism and increas-
ing interference in local social life.
As the author reminds us, there are both epis-
temological and methodological reasons why 
the history of Cypriot political parties (and the 
Cypriot left in particular) has been so little ex-
plored. This has to do first with the specific ap-
proach marking most studies on Cyprus which, 
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